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NLG systems that generate natural language text from numerical input data must decide be-
tween alternative surface linguistic forms for the natural language output. When using refer-
ring expressions to identify numerical quantities, the system must decide between vague and
crisp surface forms of the referring expression. Ideally, the system would be equipped with
heuristics that it could use to make these decisions in the way that best suits the audience:
however there is currrently little empirical data to draw on concerning the differential audience
benefits of vague and crisp surface forms. In this paper we describe a series of experiments
that investigate whether different surface forms affect the audience’s cognitive load in differ-
ent ways. We estimate cognitive load by measuring the response latencies in a forced choice
referent identification task in which we vary the surface form of the referring expression that
constitutes the instruction in the task. We find that the pattern of audience responses across
the series of experiments provides little support for the cost reduction hypothesis that vague
surface forms should place fewer cogntive demands on the audience than crisp surface forms:
instead the results support the view that referring expressions that contain numerals are more
taxing for the audience than referring expressions that use natural language quantifiers, at least
in the context of a forced choice referent identification task. We offer this work as an initial
foray into the provision of heuristics to augment NLG systems with audience-sensitivity.
Introduction
When quantities need to be referred to by an NLG system,
it should consider which manner of presentation will benefit
the readers of its output. Data from experiments with readers
have the potential to guide systems in making such decisions,
as for example in Power and Williams (2012).
Keefe and Smith (1996) give what can be regarded as a
widely accepted definition of vagueness: “vague predicates
have borderline cases, have fuzzy boundaries, and are sus-
ceptible to sorites paradoxes” (p. 4). A canonical example is
the concept tall.
Lipman (2011) argues that a limitation of standard game-
theoretical models of communication is that they are unable
to explain why so much of everyday language is vague. Lip-
man suggests one explanation for the prevalence of vague-
ness, that is cast in terms of audience effort: “For the lis-
tener, information which is too specific may require more
effort to analyze”. Van Deemter (2009) extends this line of
argument to cover the speaker’s costs too, suggesting that
benefits of vagueness can accrue when vagueness reduces
costs for speaker or hearer. We use the term cost reduction
hypothesis to refer to this cost-based line of argument, and
we test this hypothesis empirically in the experiments in this
paper.
NLG systems that generate text from numerical input
must decide between alternative linguistic forms of the same
numerical content, including how vague to be. Such sys-
tems include (Goldberg, Driedger, & Kittredge, 1994) in the
domain of weather forecasting; (Hunter et al., 2008) in the
domain of medical decision support.
Currently there is little empirical data to support NLG de-
cisions about vagueness. Mishra, Mishra, and Shiv (2011)
demonstrated that vague (but not precise) feedback can be
distorted by the hearer in such a way as to help the hearer
achieve his own goals better. However, their vague condition
took the form of an exact range of values (e.g., 30–35, com-
pared with a single value e.g, 30 in the precise condition) and
thus lacked borderline cases. (Peters et al., 2009) assessed
the impact of adding vague evaluative categories to numeri-
cal quality of care information in the rating of hospitals, but
it is unclear whether the effects were due to the mere addition
of information, or to adding vague information.
Experiments
Introduction
We designed a series of three experiments to test the cost
reduction hypothesis in a laboratory setting: this required us
to define cost in a narrow sense susceptible to measurement;
and to set up a task that would place the participants in a situ-
ation of cognitive load; as well as to operationalise vagueness
as a manipulable independent variable.
We used the forced choice paradigm to provide an experi-
mental setting where we placed participants under cognitive
load by requiring them to identify the referent of a referring
expression of quantity. Participants were presented with a
small number of dot arrays together with an instruction to
identify one of them: the instruction referred to the target
dot array by indicating the number of dots it contained, us-
ing either a vague or a crisp referring expression of quantity.
We measured the response latency between the appearance of
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nomenclature. Under this scheme, our numbers 1,2,3, and 4
are subitizable, and our numbers 5,6,7,8 and 9 are not subiti-
zable. Results were different depending on whether either of
the squares contained a subitizable number of dots. The three-
way interaction between subitizability, quantity, and vague-
ness was reliable (F(1,23) = 6.65, p < .05). When one square
did contain a subitizable number of dots, the task was ac-
complished faster, and more accurately, when the instruction
used a precise quantifier than when it used a vague quantifier
(see Figure 2). When both numbers of dots were above the
subitizable range, participants were reliably faster to respond
to vague quantifiers (e.g., many dots) than precise quantifiers
(e.g., nine dots), but only when the instruction identified the
larger of the two numbers.
Results for stimuli with a subitizable number of dots
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Figure 2: Results, experiment 1
Discussion We were unable to reject the null hypothesis
that there was no difference between response times and er-
ror rates for the vague and precise instructions. Given the
different patterns of results according to whether the stimulus
included a subitizable number of dots or not, the null effect
seems likely to be due to opposite patterns cancelling each
other out. Because stimuli with a subitizable number of dots
appear to represent a special case due to the specialised cog-
nitive routines that identify these numerosities, we decided to
investigate only non-subitizable numbers in the subsequent
experiments.
Experiment Two
Introduction We hypothesised that vague instructions
would attract faster response times and fewer errors than the
crisp instructions. This is in line with the cost reduction hy-
pothesis.
Method The second experiment used larger numbers of
dots and two squares in a similar experiment to the pilot ex-
periment. Pairs of numbers were: {5, 25} {10, 25} {15, 25}
{20, 25} {30, 25} {35, 25} {40, 25}, and the same pairs in
the other left-to-right-order. All these numbers were above
the subitizable range. Per-trial instructions used a referring
expression to indicate one of the two squares with reference
to the number of dots it contained. An example of a vague
instruction is Choose the square with few dots. An example
of a crisp instruction is Choose the square with 45 dots. We
wrote each number as a numeral (45) rather than in full (forty-
five) in this experiment, because the numbers involved were
larger than in the previous experiment, and we did not want
participants responses to be slowed by longer reading times
for the instructions that had longer words for the number. At
the start of the experiment, participants were asked to respond
quickly while avoiding errors. Experiment two attempted to
get a cleaner index of decision time than the pilot experiment,
by separating off the time taken to read the instruction from
the time taken to choose a square. Participants were required
to press a key after reading the instruction, after which a cen-
tral fixation point was displayed for one second, followed by
the stimulus. See Fig (3) for an example instruction and stim-
ulus. RT comprised only the latency between the presentation
of the stimuli, and the keypress identifying the decision.
Figure 3: Stimulus, experiment 2. Left panel shows instruc-
tion screen, right panel shows stimulus screen
Results We decided not to impose an upper limit on re-
sponse times in this experiment because the numbers of dots
involved were much larger than in experiment one, and we
wanted to allow for the possibility that participants might take
a long time to count them. No response was less than 250
ms. Response times for trials with erroneous responses were
discarded, leading to the loss of 354 trials from 5120, repre-
senting 6.9% of the trials. The results indicated that vague
quantifiers reliably attracted faster accurate response times
and fewer errors than did the crisp quantifiers, for all the com-
binations of numbers that we used. Figure (4) shows mean
response times and error rates, separated out across the levels
of numerical distance between the squares in the stimuli. The
vagueness advantage in this experiment was large, and very
reliable. For response times, the main effect of vagueness was
a 316 ms advantage in the vague conditions (mean crisp: 1246
ms; mean vague: 930 ms, F(1,19) = 12.1, p< .01 in a repeated
measures ANOVA). Mean error rates more than halved in the
vague conditions (mean crisp error rate = 9.3%; mean vague
error rate = 4.5%; Wald z= 2.3, p< .05 in a generalized linear
mixed model as recommended by Jaeger, 2008). Vagueness
brought diminishing returns as the gap size grew larger, until
at the largest gap size, it conferred no advantage relative to
crisp equivalents (see Fig. 4).
Discussion We were able to reject our null hypothesis that
there would be no difference between responses to the vague
and crisp instructions: we found evidence for faster re-
sponses, and fewer errors in the vague conditions. We in-
Figure 1. Example stimulus from experiment 2: left panel shows
the instruction; right panel shows the dot arrays
the instruction and the selection of a dot array as an indicator
of cognitive load: participants under large load should re-
spond slower than participants under small load. With other
variables held constant, it was plausible to attribute the load
to the vagueness or crispness of the instruction. The cost
reduction hypothesis predicts that vague instructions would
engender faster responses than crisp instructions: in contrast
we consider that standard game theory predicts either no dif-
ference, or an advantage for crisp instructions.
Experiments one and two
In the first two experim nts w used a the vague instruc-
tions “Choose the square with {many, few} dots.”; and as the
crisp instructions “Choose the square with {n} dots” (where
n was the number of dots in the target array). In both these
experiments participants were required to choose one from
two arrays.
A pilot experiment that used small numbers of dots (less
than 10 in each of two squares) found that when both num-
bers of dots were above the subitizable range (Trick &
Pylyshyn, 1994), vague quantifiers (e.g., many dots) attracted
faster accurate response times than precise quantifiers (e.g.,
nine dots), but only when they identified the larger of the two
numbers.
A second experiment used larger numbers of dots and two
squares in a similar experiment. Pairs of numbers were:
(5,25) (10,25) (15,25) (20,25) (30,25) (35,25) (40,25). Fig-
ure (1) illustrates the task. The results indicated that vague
quantifiers attracted faster accurate response times and fewer
errors than did the precise quantifiers, for all the combina-
tions of numbers that we used.
These two experiments used few and many as the vague
quantifiers. These quantifiers have the potential for vague-
ness in the sense of Keefe and Smith (1996). However, this
potential for vagueness was not realised because the quan-
tifier uniquely identified a single square and there were no
borderline cases. Also, the vague instructions used quanti-
fiers that did not contain a number (few, many), whereas the
precise instructions did contain numbers (e.g., five in exper-
iment one, 30 in experiments two and three), and so there
was a potential confound of vagueness with the absence of a
number in the instruction.
Experiment three
In a third experiment we set out to address these concerns.
Firstly, we used three squares, and indefinite articles in the
instructions in the vague conditions. For example, an in-
struction like Please choose a square with many dots was
used in the context of three squares (e.g., (6,15,24)), where
two plausibly contained many dots, but one contained more
dots and was therefore considered to be a better match for the
instruction, leaving the other as a borderline case. Secondly
we used both vague and precise versions of instructions that
specified numbers, and of instructions that did not specify
numbers.
We found faster responses in the no-number conditions
than the number conditions; but no main effect of the vague
/ precise manipulation; and no interaction, suggesting that
when the instructions allowed the potential for vagueness to
be realised, vagueness did not exert a beneficial influence on
response times.
The response time patterns for experiments 2 and 3 show
that while the results from experiment 2 suggest an advan-
tage for vagueness, the results from experiment 3 suggest an
alternative explanation of the same pattern such that what
appeared to be a vagueness advantage in experiment 2 is re-
vealed to be an advantage for instructions that avoid numer-
als.
Conclusions
Vagueness in a referring expression is a combination of
the referring expressions potential for borderline cases; and
the specific situation in which the referring expression is
used. We found that expressions with the potential for vague-
ness attracted faster response times than expressions without;
but only when the referent set did not allow the possibility of
borderline cases. When the referent set did allow borderline
cases, we found differences between expressions that used
numbers and those that did not, but no differences between
vague and precise expressions in either case. Although our
experiments were limited in focussing on vagueness in de-
scriptive noun phrases only, and although they did show up
advantages for certain vague expressions, they do more to
cast doubt on the cost reduction hypothesis than to confirm
it.
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